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LIST OF PARTIES
Carlos Vorher
Defendant in a criminal action filed in the Tooele Valley Justice Court (now known
as the Tooele County Justice Court) and subsequent appellant in a trial de novo in the Third
Judicial District Court of Tooele County. Petitioner for a writ of mandamus in the Utah
Court of Appeals and Appellant on writ of certiorari here.

Honorable Stephen Henriod
Respondent in the Utah Court of Appeals and Appellee in this Court. Judge of the
Third Judicial District Court of Tooele County, who presided over Mr. Vorher's trial de
novo.

Tooele City Corporation
Party in interest. Agency prosecuting Mr. Vorher.
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§78A-3-102(3) and (5) (2011 Supp.), this Court has
appellate jurisdiction over judgments of the Utah Court of Appeals, which the Court exercises
in its sole discretion by granting writs of certiorari. The Court granted a writ of certiorari in
this case on November 15, 2011.
CONTROLLING STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. §76-3-405 f2008)
(1) Where a conviction or sentence has been set aside on direct review or on
collateral attack, the court shall not impose a new sentence for the same offense
or for a different offense based on the same conduct which is more severe than
the prior sentence less the portion of the prior sentence previously satisfied.
(2) This section does not apply when:
(a)

the increased sentence is based on facts which were not known
to the court at the time of the original sentence, and the court
affirmatively places on the record the facts which provide the
basis for the increased sentence; or

(b)

a defendant enters into a plea agreement with the prosecution and
later successfully moves to invalidate his conviction, in which
case the defendant and the prosecution stand in the same position
as though the plea bargain, conviction, and sentence had never
occurred.

Utah Code Ann. S78A-7-118(1) and (2) (2011 Supp.)
(1)

In a criminal case, a defendant is entitled to a trial de novo in the
district court only if the defendant files a notice of appeal within 30
days of:

1
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(2)

(a)

sentencing after a bench or jury trial, or a plea of guilty in the
justice court resulting in a finding or verdict of guilt; or

(b)

a plea of guilty in the justice court that is held in abeyance.

If an appeal under Subsection (1) is of a plea entered pursuant to
negotiation with the prosecutor, and the defendant did not reserve the
right to appeal as part of the plea negotiation, the negotiation is voided
by the appeal.

Rule 38(e)(3) and (e)(4\ Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
(e)

District court procedures for trials de novo. An appeal by a defendant
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78A-7-l 18(1) shall be accomplished by
the following procedures:
*

*

*

(e)(3) After the trial, the district court shall, if appropriate, sentence
the defendant and enter judgment in the case as provided in
these rules and otherwise by law.

(e)(4) When entered, the judgment of conviction or order of dismissal
serves to vacate the judgment or orders of the justice court and
becomes the judgment of the case.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Tooele City Corporation concurs with Mr. Vorher5 s statement of the case with the
exception of one of his stated facts. The calculation of the amount of time Vorher was
incarcerated prior to being released by order of the Utah Court of Appeals appears to be in
error. Using Mr. Vorher5s stated dates, the City calculates his total incarceration to be no
more than lOldays.
2
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Appellant Carlos Vorher (hereafter referred to as "Vorher") argues that under the
terms of North Carolina v. Pearce. 395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072,23 L.Ed. 2d 656 (1969) and
Utah Code Ann. §76-3-405(1) (2008), he is not subject to the greater sentence imposed by
Judge Henriod after a trial de novo. However, Vorher gives no justification why he is not
subject to the exception of Utah Code Ann. §76-3-405(2)(b) (2008). Indeed, there is no basis
in the United States Constitution, the Utah Constitution, Utah statute, Utah case law, or
public policy exempting Vorher from the application of Utah Code Ann. §76-3-405(2)(b)
(2008).
In Wisden v. District Court, 694 P.2d 605 (Utah 1984) (per curiam), this Court, citing
Utah Code Ann. §76-3-405 (1953) and North Carolina v. Pearce^t/pra, held that after a trial
de novo, a district court could not sentence two justice court appellants more harshly than the
sentences given them in the justice court. While Wisden remains the general rule in regard
to defendants who have appealed their justice court convictions, Wisden does not control this
case where, pursuant to a plea agreement, Vorher pled guilty to a reduced charge of
disorderly conduct in the justice court, later repudiated his agreement by appeal to the district
court, and after jury conviction received a sentence commensurate with the more serious
crime of voyeurism.
Although the United States Supreme Court in North Carolina v. Pearce, supra,

3
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appeared to announce a broad principle that a defendant never could be sentenced more
harshly after a successful criminal appeal, the court substantially narrowed this principle in
subsequent cases. Significantly, in Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 109 S.Ct. 2201, 104
L.Ed.2d 865 (1989), the court observed that North Carolina v. Pearce had been held not to
apply to two-tiered justice court appeal systems or to cases involving negotiated pleas. Since
both of these circumstances were central to this case, there was no United States
constitutional impediment to the increased sentence Judge Henriod gave to Vorher.
In State v. Samora, 2004 UT 79, 99 P.3d 858, this Court noted the evolution of the
United States Supreme Court analysis and held that federal due process and Utah Code §763-405 protected due process under the Utah Constitution. In Samora, the Court quoted
section 76-3-405 verbatim, including the exception to the harsher sentence principle.
Accordingly, the Utah Constitution did not preclude Judge Henriod from imposing the more
severe sentence.
The Utah Court Appeals correctly held that the exception of Utah Code Ann. §76-3405(2)(b) (2008) applied to Vorher. However, the Court of Appeals included discussion in
its decision indicating that (1) the language of the statute appeared not to exactly fit justice
court appellants and that (2) Vorher and others similarly situated appeared to have lost their
right of appeal. Contrary to the Court of Appeals' assessment, the language of Utah Code
Ann. §76-3-405 (2008) expressly applies to justice court appellants when read in conjunction
with Utah Code Ann. §78A-7-l 18(2) (2011 Supp.) and Rule 38(e), Utah Rules of Criminal

4
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Procedure. Furthermore, when one considers the appeal options that all justice court
defendants are given, Vorher's rights on appeal were no different than any other justice court
appellant.
Finally, as a matter of public policy, there is no reason why Vorher should be exempt
from the exception of Utah Code §76-3-405(2)(b) (2008). As recognized by this Court and
the Court of Appeals, justice court appellants already enjoy greater rights on appeal than nonjustice court appellants. There is no public policy according Vorher even greater appellate
rights. This Court, acknowledging that prosecutors and defendants enter into plea
agreements to afford each party the benefits of reducing uncertainty and avoiding additional
expense, has held that it would be anomalous to permit a defendant to enjoy the benefit of
a repudiated agreement while requiring the prosecution to expend further resources
prosecuting the defendant.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
WISDEN v. DISTRICT COURT IS THE
SEMINAL CASE ADDRESSING
INCREASED SENTENCES AFTER JUSTICE
COURT APPEAL.
In Wisden v. District Court. 694 P.2d 605 (Utah 1984) (per curiam), this Court held
that Utah Code §76-3-405, the United States constitutional right to due process, and the Utah
constitutional right to appeal applied to de novo appeals from the justice court to the district

5
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court. In that case, two brothers had been convicted injustice court of class B
misdemeanors and had appealed to the district court. The district court found the brothers
guilty after a trial de novo and sentenced them more harshly than they had been sentenced
in the justice court. The brothers sought extraordinary relief from this Court. In ordering the
district court judge to resentence the defendants, the Court stated:
U.C.A., 1953, §76-3-405 provides that the sentence imposed
after retrial shall not be more severe than the original sentence
when the first conviction is set aside on direct or collateral
attack. In State v. Sorensen, Utah, 639 P.2d 179 (1981), we
interpreted this statute to mean that no new element of sentence
can be added on retrial; that no element may be augmented and
that the statute precludes justifying an increase in one element
of sentence by elimination of another. As the time commitment
in plaintiffs' sentences was increased by the district court,
though the fines were eliminated, the district court sentences
were contrary to section 76-3-405 and were invalid as impairing
plaintiffs' constitutional rights to appeal. See State v. Sorensen,
supra; Chess v. Smith. Utah, 617 P.2d 341 (1980).
Because a justice of the peace court in this state is not a court of
record, an appeal from that court is by way of a trial de novo in
the district court, rather than a review of the justice's rulings.
The district court judge, sitting as a trial judge, may have
reasoned that section 76-3-405 did not apply, since the first
conviction was not "set aside on direct review or on collateral
attack."
Our rule is not confined to the statutory limitation, however. In
State v. Sorensen, supra, this Court followed due process
requirements enunciated in North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S.
711, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969), in ruling that a
defendant should be freed of the apprehension of a more severe
sentence as a retaliation for exercising his right of appeal. In
Chess v. Smith, supra, we held that a person's decision to avail
himself of the right to appeal guaranteed under art. VIII, sec. 9
6
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of the Utah Constitution may not be impaired by making it
conditional on taking the risk of a harsher sentence after the
second trial. Plaintiffs are guaranteed the right to appeal from
the justice court to the district court pursuant to art. VIII, sec. 9
of the Utah Constitution. They should not be required to take the
risk of a longer jail sentence in order to exercise that right.

Wisden, 694 P.2d at 606. While Wisden stated the law as it existed at the time the Court
rendered its decision, subsequent United States Supreme Court decisions and consequent
amendment to the Utah Code led to the Utah Court of Appeals decision in this case.
POINT II
THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION WAS
CONSISTENT WITH ESTABLISHED
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
PRECEDENT.
In North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072,23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969), the
principal case this Court cited in Wisden, supra, the defendant had successfully appealed his
conviction, had been retried, again had been found guilty, and had been sentenced to a term
that in combination with the time he had previously served exceeded the sentence initially
given him. The United States Supreme Court held that the due process clause of the United
States Constitution precluded a sentencing judge from imposing a more severe penalty in
retaliation against the defendant for having exercised the defendant's right to appeal:
i

Due process of law, then, requires that vindictiveness against a
defendant for having successfully attacked his first conviction
must play no part in the sentence he receives after a new trial.
And since the fear of such vindictiveness may unconstitutionally
deter a defendant's exercise of the right to appeal or collaterally
7
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attack his first conviction, due process also requires that a
defendant be freed of apprehension of such a retaliatory
motivation on the part of the sentencing judge.
Pearce, 395 U.S. at 725, 89 S.Ct. at 2080. Subsequently, the United States Supreme Court
narrowed the scope of Pearce, exempting de novo trial appellate systems and cases involving
negotiated pleas.
In Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 109 S.Ct. 2201, 104 L.Ed.2d 865 (1989), the
defendant had negotiated a plea bargain whereby the prosecution had agreed to drop one of
the charges in return for guilty pleas to the remainder of the charges. The trial court
sentenced the defendant to a term of thirty years in prison. The defendant successfully
appealed his conviction, then was tried and convicted on all charges, and was given a much
longer prison term. The United States Supreme Court upheld the sentence, stating:
While the Pearce opinion appeared on its face to announce a rule
of sweeping dimension, our subsequent cases have made clear
that its presumption of vindictiveness "do[es] not apply in every
case where a convicted defendant receives a higher sentence on
retrial." Texas v. McCullough, supra, at 138. As we explained
in Texas v. McCullough, "the evil the [Pearce] Court sought to
prevent" was not the imposition of "enlarged sentences after a
new trial," but "vindictiveness of a sentencing judge." Ibid. See
also Chaffin v. Stvnchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 25 (1973) (the
Pearce presumption was not designed to prevent the imposition
of an increased sentence on retrial "for some valid reason
associated with the need for flexibility and discretion in the
sentencing process," but was "premised on the apparent need to
guard against vindictiveness in the resentencing process").
Because the Pearce presumption "may operate in the
absence of any proof of an improper motive, and thus . . .
block a legitimate response to criminal conduct," United
States v, Goodwin, supra at 373, we have limited its
8
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application, like that of "other 'judicially created means of
effectuating the rights secured by the [Constitution]/" to
circumstances "where its 'objectives are thought most
efficaciously served/" Texas v. McCullougbu supra, at 138
quoting Stone v. Powell 428 U.S. 465,482, 487 (1976). Such
circumstances are those in which there is a "reasonable
likelihood," United States v. Goodwin, supra, at 373, that the
increase in sentence is the product of actual vindictiveness on
the part of the sentencing authority. Where there is no such
reasonable likelihood, the burden remains upon the defendant to
prove actual vindictiveness, see Wasman v. United States, 468
U.S. 559, 569(1984).
In Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972), for example, we
refused to apply the presumption when the increased
sentence was imposed by the second court in a two-tier
system which gave a defendant convicted of a misdemeanor
in an inferior court the right to trial de novo in a superior
court. We observed that the trial de novo represented a
"completely fresh determination of guilt or innocence" by a
court that was not being "asked to do over what it thought
it had already done correctly." Id. at 117. If the de novo trial
resulted in a greater penalty, we said that "it no more follows
that such a sentence is a vindictive penalty . . . than that the
inferior court imposed a lenient penalty." Ibid. Consequently,
we rejected the proposition that greater penalties on retrial
were explained by vindictiveness "with sufficient frequency
to warrant the imposition of a prophylactic rule." Id. at 116.
Similarly, in Chaffin v. Stvnchcombe. 412 U.S. 17 (1973), we
held that no presumption of vindictiveness arose when a second
jury, on retrial following a successful appeal, imposed a higher
sentence than a prior jury. We thought that a second jury was
unlikely to have a "personal stake" in the prior conviction or to
be "sensitive to the institutional interests that might occasion
higher sentences." Id- at 26-28.
We think the same reasoning leads to the conclusion that,
when a greater penalty is imposed after trial than was
imposed after a prior guilty plea, the increase in sentence is
not more likely than not attributable to the vindictiveness on
9
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the part of the sentencing judge. Even when the same judge
imposes both sentences, the relevant sentencing information
available to the judge after the plea will usually be
considerably less than that available after a trial. A guilty
plea must be both "voluntary" and "intelligent," Bovkin v.
Alabama. 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969), because it "is the
defendant's admission in open court that he committed the acts
charged in the indictment," Brady v. United States, 397 U.S.
742,748 (1970). But the sort of information which satisfies this
requirement will usually be far less than that brought out in a
full trial on the merits.
As this case demonstrates, supra, at 796-797, in the course of the
proof at trial, the judge may gather a fuller appreciation of the
nature and extent of the crimes charged. The defendant's
conduct during trial may give the judge insights into his moral
character and suitability for rehabilitation. Supra, at 797. See
United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 53 (1978) (sentencing
authority's perception of the truthfulness of a defendant
testifying on his own behalf may be considered in sentencing).
Finally, after trial, the factors that may have indicated leniency
as consideration for the guilty plea are no longer present. See
Brady v. United States, supra, at 752.
Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. at 799-801, 109 S.Ct. at 2204-2206. [Emphasis added].
To summarize, federal due process does not require a presumption of vindictiveness (1)
where greater penalties are imposed in two-tiered de novo trial appellate systems or (2) in
circumstances where a defendant initially pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement and a
sentencing judge had more information after hearing evidence at trial. Both of these
circumstances apply to Vorher.

10
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POINT III
FEDERAL DUE PROCESS AND UTAH
CODE §76-3-405 PRESERVE THE STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE OF A
RIGHT OF APPEAL.
In Wisden, supra, at 606, this Court cited Chess v. Smith, 617 P.2d 341 (Utah 1980)
for the broad proposition that under the terms of the state constitution a person's right to
appeal could not be impaired by the risk of receiving a harsher sentence after a second trial.
Subsequently, after reviewing United States Supreme Court precedent, this Court refined its
analysis and stated that the state constitutional guarantee of the right of appeal is preserved
by federal due process and Utah Code §76-3-405.
The Court summarized the applicable concepts in State v. Samora, 2004 UT 79,
ffl 15-17, 99 P.3d 858:
We have long held that when a defendant successfully has his
conviction or sentence set aside on appeal, the court generally
cannot impose a harsher sentence on resentencing. Both federal
due process and Utah statutory provisions protect against the
imposition of a harsher sentence. See, e.g.. North Carolina v.
Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 723-24, 89 S.Ct. 2072 (1969); State v.
Sorensen, 639 P.2d 179, 180-81 (Utah 1981); Chess v. Smith,
617 P.2d 341, 343 (1980); Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-405 (2003).
The United States Supreme Court first explained this principle
in Pearce, where it held that, while harsher sentences are not
absolutely prohibited by the constitution, due process "requires
that vindictiveness against a defendant for having successfully
attacked his first conviction must play no part in the sentence he
receives after a new trial." 395 U.S. at 725, 89 S.Ct 2072. The
Court concluded that:
whenever a judge imposes a more severe sentence
11
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upon a defendant after a new trial, the reasons for
his doing so must affirmatively appear. Those
reasons must be based upon objective information
concerning identifiable conduct on the part of the
defendant occurring after the time of the original
sentencing proceeding.
Id. ai .-o, 8*- ^
.<' '2. see also Sorenscn, 639 P M a' 12f\
The Pearce Co mi reasoned that these protections are particularly
necessary in ,»rdei to ensure that there :s J.O chilling ,>f a
defendant's tor- M^.-init- »vi'M.|iiT..,:irP!.:l| =Q5U.s. a* "?4,
89 S.Ct. 2072.
In subsequent eases,, the Supreme Cuuri 1:.;.- DL,:.U caivlul. not to
construe Pearce too broadi), stating that the Pearce presumption
~*r vmdictiveness "do[es] not apply in every ease where a
dieted defendant receives a higher sentence on retrial."
.as v. McCullough. 475 U.S. 134, 138, 106 S.Ct 976, 89
d.2d 104 (1986). The Court has "restricted application of
iiee to areas where its objectives are thought most
efficaciously served." Id. (internal quotations omitted). For
example, the "presumption of Pearce cioes: n>i a:>pi\ in situations
where the possibility of ' \ "ndicliveness i- -\e-"\ ; speculative,
particularly since Lhe presumption :,.'_v \c peraie in the
nee of any nronfoi an improper motn r and itius , block
a legitimate response to criminal conduct
d w ^
)6 Q Ct.
976 (internal quotations omitted)
Hi (idditiwn

' v

JL-_ r -;. u'.:.S;-. p : . lecl:,*hb,

,;;^

Legislature ha* enacted Utah Code section 7&-3-4U5, wnich
states as follows:
I 11 I Where a conviction, or sentence has been set
aside on direct review" or on collateral attack, the
court shall not impose a new sentence for the
same offense or for a different offense based on
the same conduct which is more severe than the
prior sentence less the portion of the prior
lenience previously satisfied.
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(2) This section does not apply when:
(a) the increased sentence is based on facts
which were not known to the court at the time of
the original sentence, and the court affirmatively
places on the record the facts which provide the
basis for the increased sentence; or
(b) a defendant enters into a plea agreement with
the prosecution and later successfully moves to
invalidate his conviction, in which case the
defendant and the prosecution stand in the same
position as though the plea bargain, conviction,
and sentence had never occurred.
Utah Code Ann. §76-3-405 (2003). Like the due process
protections described in Pearce, this statutory provision
"prevents the Utah constitutional right to appeal [as
contained in article VIII, section 9] from being impaired by
imposing on a defendant who demonstrates the error of his
conviction [or sentence] the risk that he may be penalized
with a harsher sentence for having done so." Sorensen, 639
P.2d at 180 (internal quotations omitted); see also Chess, 617
P.2d at 343.
[Emphasis added.] In view of this Court's statement that federal due process and Utah Code
§76-3-405 preserve the Utah Constitution's guarantee of the right to appeal, the Court of
Appeals decision in this case did not contravene the Utah Constitution, because the Court of
Appeals properly applied Utah Code Ann. §76-3-405 (2008) to this case.
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nA^iini^ii IJHLAI A J U M I L E
COURT APPEAL IS BEST VIEWED AS
ANALOGOUS TO AN APPEAL FROM A
DISTRICT COURT TO AN APPELLATE
COURT, EVEN THOUGH THE FORM OF
THE APPEAL IS BY TRIAL DE NO^ m

THIS<UUUKI

justice court appellate process and the approach to be utilized when analy-'irs appellate
issues as follows:
Justice courts are courts "not of record, authorized by article
VIII, section 1 of the Utah Constitution and governed by the
Utah Code. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 78o-101 to -140 (2002).
Justice courts are created by municipalities or counties, id. §785-101.5 , and have jurisdiction over certain small claims cases,
"class B and C misdemeanors, violate >i aduvinces and
infractions committed within [the justke courts ^ ;err . >nal
jurisdiction, except those offenses o\ er u • H h i, juvenile court
has exclusive jurisdiction,," id §78-5- .1 i
Because justice courts are cour ts not of recor d, the appeals
process from a justice court decision is unique. A defendant who
has pleaded guilty or been convicted injustice court is entitled
to a trial de novo in a district court, provided that he or she files
a noikc o( apr-n thirtx da\ ^ o\ -he semence or guilty
plea Id. §7X- :.v-M ! K

convicted in a Utah justkt ,oun exercisi - m* n-- he; right to a
trial Je ;K>\ o. ihe justice court s\ stem >triu. i ur\s the dc novo trial
itself as an appellate review of die onv aio< alKit i- inal
f^r\ti instead -.-? a more traditional 4 »n* •** yrd;;*u- re iew.
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Thus, a defendant stands in a position similar to a district court
defendant appealing his or her conviction before either this court
or the court of appeals. And where j eopardy has attached in the
justice court proceeding and remains attached without
termination during the trial de novo, continuing jeopardy allows
for a defendant-initiated appellate review in the form of a de
novo trial without implicating double jeopardy concerns. Cf.
Lydon, 466 U.S. at 308-09, 104 S.Ct. 1805.
Utah's system is best viewed as placing defendants in the same
position as district court defendants appealing their sentence in
the first instance for several reasons. First, Utah's system is
structured to allow district courts to exercise appellate
jurisdiction. Article VIII, section 5 of the Utah Constitution
clearly states that district courts "shall have appellate
jurisdiction as provided by statute." Utah Const, art. VIII, §5
(emphasis added). Consistent with this authority, the Utah
Legislature has provided that district courts "ha[ve] appellate
jurisdiction to adjudicate trials de novo of the judgments of the
justice court." Utah Code Ann. §78-3-4(5) (2002) (emphasis
added). In light of this framework, we have previously held that
in Utah, a trial de novo in district court satisfies the right to
appeal from a justice court. City of Monticello v. Christensen,
788 P.2d 513, 516 (Utah 1990).

Since Vorher's appeal to the district court was a direct appeal, Utah Code Ann. §76-3-405
(2008) applied to Vorher, and the Court of Appeals reached the correct result.

15
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POIJS
BECAUSE THE DISTRICT COURT WAS
ACTING IN A TRUE APPELLATE ROLE,
THE TERMS OF UTAH CODE §76-3-405,
INCLUDING I HE EXCEPTION OF
SUBPARAGRAPH (2) ( b), EXPRESSLY
APPLIED TO MR. VORHER.
A. The Court of Appeals Reached the Appropriate Result But Some of the Court's
Comments Require Modification.
The Court of Appeals properly held that Utah Code Ann. ^ 6 - M0S(? |(h! l '"'KIKl
applied to Vorhcr and sustained the district court's sent/Met Vorher v. Henriod, 2011 UT
Ap|J IIW, V *»
rcsuili, mli ill

.

•. •.

: Knvevr *vHc *he C~ort ~f \ppcals reached the correct

'

Court's prior caseb and statutory :anL»ua •.,

v

,
^

'

..-ic.-: accord with tins
is :

We recognize :-. »^ a >;nu -uis^. Vorhcr and others vho
vacate their plea agreements injustice con- I in wiuoMing ,; ".rial
de nn\ o in district court do not "stand in he a- ic positi i as
though the plea bargain, conviction, and sentence had never
occurred," see id,, because they have lost the right to appellate
review. See id. §78A-7-l 18(8) (Supp. 2010) ("The decision of
the district court is final and may not be appealed unless the
district court rules on the constitutionality of a statute or
ordinance.") However, we are not convinced that the legislature
intended to exclude justia. inun pica agiwincib; from section
76-3-405(2)(b)'s exception to the general i =;ie against increased
punishment following appeals Rather, ,• appears that section
76-3-405 was intended to c«»\er all crinrnal appeals but was
drafted without specific consideration of lie practical
differences between, p1-'*
-;*rt -ippe-- v ' ^ r,":,,t ^irt
U U U V U I L ) .
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The Utah Supreme Court has applied section 76-3-405 to justice
court appeals even though the statutory language is in some
ways inconsistent with the justice court appeal process. See
Wisden v. District Court 694 P.2d 605, 606 (Utah 1984) (per
curiam) (applying section 76-3-405(1) to a trial de novo
following an appeal from the justice court, despite the statute's
language limiting its application to situations where a conviction
was set aside on direct review or on collateral attack). Compare
State v. Powell 957 P.2d 595,596-97 (Utah 1998) (holding that
the successful withdrawal of a guilty plea, even after appeal,
does not constitute the setting aside of a conviction on direct
review or collateral attack).
Vorher, 211 UT 199 , Tfl2 and fn. 4, 262 P.3d 42.

Contrary to the Court of Appeals5

statements, the Bernat analysis and the rules of criminal procedure demonstrate that the
language of section 76-3-405 specifically applies both to traditional and to justice court
appeals. Furthermore, Vorher and others in his position have not been denied their right to
appeal.
B. The Language of Section 76-3-405(1) Applies to Justice Court Appeals.
Utah Code Ann. §76-3-405(1) (2008) reads as follows:
Where a conviction or sentence has been set aside on direct
review or on collateral attack, the court shall not impose a new
sentence for the same offense or for a different offense based on
the same conduct which is more severe than the prior sentence
less the portion of the prior sentence previously satisfied.
The introductory phrase of this section includes two concepts - direct review and setting
aside a conviction or sentence. These concepts specifically apply to justice court appeals.
(1) Direct Review.
In Bernat supra, this Court unequivocally stated that an appeal from a justice court
17
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to th. di^tnt.. C»MII. i.> analogous to an appeal from a district court to a traditional appellate

not

diminish in an,)r respect the fact that the district court lunetioii'i a • thr <1M <V< n " "en

authority for justice court; appeals,
(2) Setting Aside Conviction or Sentence
h

"

•

e.
x

conviction or >, "I.*"
(c;

. _i:,:.. ;>j-.ak ,0 the issue of setting aside a.

applicab
f<u. ; ^'rurednrcs '>ir 'i-ak de
\\* an x:al h\ ;i dcfendani (-Tsuant
;** i tiilu oil '• ir. ":K N
' X( i »^hal he
accomplished by the following procedures:

Pisimi

(e)(3 Aitci UK mai, UK -H .
shall, if appropriate -.n.e'ice ihe
defendant and enter judgment in the
case a> provided in ihese rules and
otherwise by law.
(e)(4) W hen entered, the judgment of
conviction or order of dismissal
serves to vacate the judgment or
orders of the justice court and
becomes the judgment of the case.
i..i -Xie) dictates that the district court judgment, when entered, serves to vacate the
coin I ill in1, selling aside the conviction or sentence" as provided in
Utah Code §76- \ 4IIS; | ) | h ihv II.) ih express terms, su I'IOII "'ir \ Hh| I i apphe% In \u Jliu*
court a|)peals.
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C. The Statutory Exception Specifically Applies to Justice Court Appeals.
Utah Code Ann. §76-3-405(2) (2008) reads as follows:
(2) This section [i.e. §76-3-405(1)] does not apply when:
* * *

(b) a defendant enters into a plea agreement with
the prosecution and later successfully moves to
invalidate his conviction, in which case the
defendant and the prosecution stand in the same
position as though the plea bargain, conviction,
and sentence had never occurred.
This subparagraph lists two conditions and a consequence if the conditions are met. The first
condition is a negotiated plea, and the second condition is a successful move to invalidate the
conviction. Once the conditions are fulfilled, the statute states the relationship between the
parties.
It is undisputed that Vorher and the prosecution entered into a plea agreement. The
remaining question is whether Vorher "successfully mov[ed] to invalidate his conviction."
(1) Successful invalidation of conviction.
Pursuant to his plea agreement, Vorher pled guilty to disorderly conduct, a class C
misdemeanor, in the justice court. When he filed his appeal, Vorher unalterably set in motion
the successful invalidation of his conviction, i.e. Vorher precluded himself from ever being
subject to a conviction for disorderly conduct in a trial de novo.
Utah Code Ann.§78A-7-l 18(2) (2011 Supp.) addresses the circumstance where a

19
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defendant appeals a conviction arising ft om a negotiated plea in the justice court;
If an appeal under Subseuiwi. M . .> -I a pica entered pursuant
to negotiation with the prosecutor, and the defendant did not
reserve the right to appeal as part, of the plea negotiation, the
negotiation is voided by the appeal.
Vorher does not claim,, that as part of his negotiated plea he reserved a right U appe.i- the
disoi derly coiuhu'l coin, ulmn

I k ackno^v v ledges that the trial de novo proeu Jo, * -.- WK)

the only possible outcomes of the trial de novo were a guilty or a not gi lilty verdict to the
voyeurism c1":•":.: °>v appealing and voiding his plea agreement, Vorher "successfully
move[u
b

,. ..w .11. ,
.

I

.

. v i vii-wivuny .WJK: «,,. .i-vc he could never ultimately

• - •

(2) Standing in the same position as though the
plea bargain, conviction, and sentence had
never occurred.
I he ("outl oJ Appeals appeared to interpret the phrase, "the defendant and the

had never occurred," as though the conviction for disorderly condi ict and the resi iking
sentence had. never occurred, I lence., the court apparently concluded that in some manner
Vorher had lost his right to appeal.
Neither I Hull i "ink" Ann ft7fK?...JiH(:M(|.| (.'OONi mn ;WK;V Ml INu!) (J Il I Supp I
voided the conviction entered and the sentence pronounced a;>niii ,1 VuiU'i m Ihv m ho
court: As discussed in Point V(B)(2) above, the entry of the district court ji ldgment after trial
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de novo vacated the justice court judgement pursuant to Rule 38(e)(4), Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure.
Sections 76-3-405(2)(b) and 78A-7-118(2) address the relationship between Vorher
and the prosecution after Vorher appealed. Pursuant to §78A-7-l 18(2), the appeal voided
the negotiation. After Vorher successfully invalidated his conviction for disorderly conduct,
both Vorher and the prosecution stood "in the same position as though the plea bargain,
conviction, and sentence had never occurred." In other words, after appeal neither party was
bound by the duties nor stood to benefit from the negotiated agreement.
D. Contrary to the Court of Appeals' Conclusion, Vorher Did Not Lose Any Right to
Appeal and Stands in a Position No Different than Any Other Justice Court Appellant.
A defendant in the justice court has four options. Under Utah Code Ann. §78A-7118(1) (2011 Supp.), a defendant can try the original charge and appeal a conviction to the
district court, or the defendant can plead guilty to the original charge in the justice court and
appeal to the district court. As third or fourth options, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78A-7118(2) (2011 Supp.), the defendant can plead to a lesser charge in the justice court and have
a trial de novo on the lesser charge, if that right has been preserved in the plea negotiation,
or do what Vorher did - plead guilty to a lesser charge and have a trial on the original charge
in the district court. No matter what option a defendant chooses, the defendant convicted in
the justice court has a right to appeal to the district court for a trial de novo. If convicted in
the trial de novo, the defendant has no further right to appeal unless the district court has
ruled on the constitutionality of a statute or ordinance under Utah Code Ann. §78A-7-118(8)
21

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

(2011 Supp.) I his Court previously upheld the constitutionality of this appeal process in City
ol Monticellu v. Uinstcnsen. 78S P 2d S I \ n (11;ih i^itl) See also. Bcrnatv. Allplun., ,!()(!>
UT1, ][25, 106 P.3d 707. Accordingly, Vorher did not lose any -L'ht

•" irociiaic n. • c

accorded others in the justice court system.

]

PUBLICruLic* SUPFOK is 111¥ ^ in>n r
OF APPEALS DECISION
A. The Utah Courts Have Recognized that Justice Court Appellants Already Receive
More Appellate Process than Non-Justice Court Appellants.
i, ; e ^ ^an 'ii.icu

^ n t sup^rr th.°t two-tiered justice cor/t systems gi \ire a

uii-n iua .k-lci law.
Lv\j justice court deieiHlani -N iiiiisinhiui i
appealing from a district court conviction in the firs! msneice.
When viewed l?vi.: this . -ifa' pe^peri c, ,; |u-;;cc ,jurt
defendant is, ifan> thing, treated more fav;*;abl\ than :->nn arly
situated district court defendant. • :nhke defendants appealing
from a district court, conviction, a defendant convicted injustice
court is afforded a second opportunity to rchtigate the ucis
relating to his or her guilt or innocence alter having ha-! the
advantage of learning about the prosecuf''"1^ —v •••r,T» •!••
first trial.
Bernat v. Allphir. 2005 T — r ;- - v ^ ni "I1"

;hL •_ tah L\JLL-_ of Appeals also

acknowledged \n\s .nu-ea^ in process m avlorsville City v. Adkins. 20P r TTT \ jp 374, ]f6,
1 h IP ]ul i in-1 ,i i ust" cuing licniat,
The nature of 1.1ah sjustkv LOLHI ^vsien
w_.. uci.nou. *. ^
defendant is convicted of a crime in ajustice court, he ir> emnled
to atrial de \w\^ in :i di^ru i .ouii. See id. § 7 8 - > I 2 J V 1 ; . J i ^
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trial de novo is the constitutional equivalent of a district court
defendant's appeal to the Utah Supreme Court or this court. See
Bernat v. Allphin. 2005 UT 1, |25, 106 P.3d 707 ("Utah's
system is best viewed as placing defendants in the same position
as district court defendants appealing their sentence in the first
instance ...."). In fact, "a justice court defendant is, if
anything, treated more favorably than a similarly situated
district court defendant." Id. at f 41. This is because not
only is a justice court defendant afforded the right to
appellate review of legal conclusions, but also a new
opportunity to have a trier of fact review the case unfettered
by prior factual findings. See id. Further, he is able to
obtain this review without the requirement that he allege
any error in the justice court proceedings. See Utah Code
Ann. §78-05-120.
[Emphasis added.] The courts in Bernat and Adkins agreed that the additional process given
justice court defendants derives from the nature of the trial de novo appeal itself.
In this case, Vorher was afforded the opportunity of two trials on the original charge, but he
exercised his choice to plead guilty to a lesser charge and to forego the first trial. Now,
having made his choice, he seeks an additional right that non-justice court appellants do not
have - an exemption from the application of Utah Code Ann. §76-3-405(2)(b) (2008).
Vorher has not stated any legal basis or public policy supporting a further extension ofjustice
court appellate rights. Indeed, as previously expressed by this Court, public policy militates
against Vorher's request.
B. This Court Has Stated Public Policy in Regard to Defendants Who Have Rejected
Their Plea Agreements and Later Sought the Benefit of the Voided Bargains.
In State v. Powell. 957 P.2d 595 (Utah 1998) and State v. Maguire. 957 P.2d 598
(Utah 1998), this Court considered cases where, through plea negotiations, the defendants
23
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Lull pleaded gutlh, had been sentenced and then had attempted ,< v\ ncii*.- acr guilty

courts were reversed on appeal. After the defendants withdrew their guilty pleas in the trial
court, one of the defendants again eom.proui.ised with the prosecution and pled guilty A jury
foui 1,(1 the second defendant guilty at trial. Both delcndants were given, sentences m..ore

to their original sentences pursuant to Utah Code §76-3-405, which at the time: the said, noes
were imposed had M,>[ \et been amend A; to address the inapplicability of the statute to
sentences pronouncec u>k; » ^ud^d inca agreements. After holding that the language n r pf:

uhe increases, sentences,

stating:
We also believe that it would be unw ise to hold that a sentence
imposed pursuant to a plea agreement s*- uld hmii a sentence
subsequently imposed at trial afu r dctendam h i.- A iihdrawn his
plea. Plea bargains are entered into so that both Mdes may avoid
the expense and uncertaint\ of a tria! h exchange for
conserving State resources, defendant usuali\ ;eceives a lower
charge or lesser sentence. Thus, it would be anomalous to allow
a defendant to keep the benein >t an agreement he repudiated
while requiring the State U proceed to trial and prove its case.
Povxell.

•: • l-/T This public policy has eve

cod" ••

•

>• 1 40S( M(bi iiJMJOX)

vrv force m \ ih-j "t has been
•.

_.

!ipp.)

CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeals' holding that Utah Code A^r ;: v . i- iii^i: b)' 1008) applies
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to justice court appellants is consistent with the United States Constitution, the Utah
Constitution, Utah statute, and prior decisions of this Court. Accordingly, Tooele City
respectfully submits that this Court should affirm the Court of Appeals decision, even if the
Court finds it necessary to clarify the Court of Appeals' analysis or language.
Dated this 3 /

day of May, 2012.

^

M. Douglas Bayly
Attorney for Tooele City Corporation
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